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It is well known that on the Internet, computer algorithms track our website browsing, 
clicks, and search history to infer our preferences, interests, and goals. The nature of this 
algorithmic tracking remains unclear, however. Does it involve what many cognitive 
scientists and philosophers call ‘mindreading’, i.e., an epistemic capacity to attribute 
mental states to people to predict, explain, or influence their actions? Here I argue that it 
does. This is because humans are in a particular way embedded in the process of 
algorithmic tracking. Specifically, if we endorse common conditions for extended 
cognition, then human mindreading (by website operators and users) is often literally 
extended into, that is, partly realized by, not merely causally coupled to, computer 
systems performing algorithmic tracking. The view that human mindreading extends 
outside the body into computers in this way has significant ethical advantages. It points to 
new conceptual ways to reclaim our autonomy and privacy in the face of increasing risks 
of computational control and online manipulation. These benefits speak in favor of 
endorsing the notion of extended mindreading.  
 




When we go online to find information, do research, or communicate with others, we produce 
‘digital footprints’: we leave behind data about ourselves in our browsing history, clicks, 
website visiting time, personal profiles, social media ‘likes’, and so on (Lambiotte & Kosinski, 
2014). Many websites (Google, Amazon, Facebook, etc.) employ artificial intelligence (AI) 
systems such as machine learning algorithms to collect these data, recognize patterns in them, 
and infer our preferences, interests, and goals. Their aim is to tailor website content to us so as 
to keep us engaged (Lynch, 2019; Hinds & Joinson, 2019). Call the process in which algorithms 
monitor digital footprints and infer website users’ preferences, interests, goals, etc. from them 
algorithmic tracking.  
 
Researchers sometimes claim that in algorithmic tracking, computer systems make 
“psychological inferences”, “judgements”, and “assumptions on an individual’s goals, interests 
and preferences” (Youyou et al., 2015, p. 4; Zanker et al., 2019, p. 190). The suggestion is 
that these “machines […] read our minds” in that they “infer or predict some information 
pertaining to […] the psychological constructs [i.e., mind] of individual users, based on a 
sample of the subject’s observable behaviour” (Burr & Cristianini, 2019, pp. 461, 465).  
 
But do these descriptions adequately capture what is happening in algorithmic tracking? Or are 
they instances of researchers applying their “intentional stance” to AI, resulting in ascriptions of 
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psychological capacities to computers that they in fact lack (Dennett, 1987)? More specifically, 
does algorithmic tracking involve what philosophers and psychologists call “mindreading”, an 
epistemic capacity to identify and attribute mental states to an agent to predict, explain, or 
shape the agent’s action (Nichols & Stich, 2003; Apperly, 2011)?  
 
It might seem clear that it doesn’t. While there is debate on when exactly a being can be said to 
display mindreading (Halina, 2015), most minimally, it requires an agent with a mind to do the 
mindreading with. And the AI under consideration arguably doesn’t meet that requirement 
(yet). Moreover, it is commonly assumed that for inferring and predicting mental states and so 
for mindreading, one needs to have at least a basic grasp of what a mental state is, which, in 
turn, requires being able to distinguish reality and appearance and understand that reality might 
be different from how an agent believes it to be (Peters, 2021). Yet, the AI currently used for 
website personalization clearly can’t do that either.1  
 
However, in the following, I will provide reasons to believe that algorithmic tracking does 
indeed involve mindreading because humans are embedded in this process in a specific way that 
relates to Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) “hypothesis of extended cognition” (HEC). HEC states 
that cognition might sometimes be partly realized by objects outside of one’s body (for an 
overview on HEC, see Sprevak, 2020). I will argue that if we endorse common conditions for 
extended cognition, then computer systems that perform algorithmic tracking are often not 
merely epistemic tools that people use for mindreading. Rather, they literally extend, i.e., 
realize the human mindreading by website operators and website users. 
 
My argument for this extended mindreading view assumes common conditions for extended 
cognition and HEC. Since HEC isn’t uncontroversial (Adams & Aizawa, 2008), I will offer 
support for a particular set of conditions for extended cognition that provides a response to 
some familiar objections to HEC. I will, however, not make a case for HEC here. I rest content 
with a conditional argument for the extended mindreading view: ‘If we endorse common 
conditions for extended cognition then […].’ If successful, this conditional argument still has 
important implications.  
 
First, a recent review of the literature on HEC concludes that it is by “no means clear” that the 
arguments for HEC “cannot be made to work” (Sprevak, 2020, p. 6). That is, the case for HEC 
is alive. It should thus be interesting to see whether HEC also applies to mindreading. For even 
though HEC has been applied to various kinds of cognitions (beliefs, knowledge, etc., see ibid), 
it hasn’t been related to mindreading yet. In the cognitive scientific research on mindreading, 
too, it is commonly assumed that mindreading is situated solely within an individual’s head 
(Spaulding, 2020). Also, while the idea that human cognition might extend into the Internet 
(Heersmink & Sutton, 2020; Schwengerer, 2021) or partly constitute the realizer for machine-
based cognitive capabilities (Smart, 2018) isn’t new, mindreading hasn’t been considered in this 
context yet.  
 
Second, even if the case for extended mindreading that I will develop below remains 
conditional, it helps to bring out that the notion of extended mindreading has in fact significant 
practical and ethical benefits that the alternative that human mindreading is merely embedded 
in, i.e., causally coupled to, computer algorithms lacks. This is because the notion of extended 
mindreading points to novel conceptual strategies to defend our autonomy and privacy in the 
light of increasing risks of computational control and online manipulation. There are thus 
																																																								
1 But see also Rabinowitz et al. (2018). 
	 3	
ethical reasons for endorsing the notion of extended mindreading that add a new perspective to 
the debate on the societal implications of cognitive extensions into AI technology (Frischmann 
& Selinger, 2018; Hernandez-Orallo & Vold, 2019). 
 
In sections 2 and 3, I distinguish two kinds of algorithmic tracking and motivate the claim that 
certain types of trait and preference ascriptions are proper instances of mindreading. In section 
4, I build on these points to argue that algorithmic tracking involves human mindreading. In 
section 5, I introduce conditions for extended cognition, before, in sections 6 and 7, using 
them to support the extended mindreading view.  
2. Two kinds of algorithmic tracking 
When online companies monitor our digital footprints to form user profiles for website 
personalization, at least two types of algorithmic tracking might be involved. I shall call them 
simple algorithmic tracking, and psychometric tracking.  
 
Recommender systems on Amazon or Netflix fall into the first category (Gomez-Uribe & 
Hunt, 2015). To produce suggestions related to what items a user might want to buy, watch, 
or read, the algorithms that are involved commonly (in ‘collaborative’ filtering)2 (1) track a 
website user’s previous purchases, ratings, items viewed, or clicking behavior, (2) build a 
model of the user on their basis, and (3) find a group of other website users whose purchases, 
ratings, or views overlap (Ricci et al., 2011). The algorithms then (4) aggregate items from 
these similar users, (5) delete items from the resulting list that the individual user has already 
bought, rated, or viewed, and (6) recommend the remaining ones (ibid).  
 
This process can be viewed as simple tracking because when the algorithms link certain user 
profiles to recommendations (expressed with, e.g., ‘You might also like […]’), they don’t 
represent the recommended items as the user’s preferences: There is no explicit categorization 
of people in terms of aspects of their psychology. The algorithms just predict that, based on 
their previous online behavior, particular website users are likely to display other kinds of 
online behaviors that the algorithms are designed to maximize (clicks, ‘likes’, etc.). While the 
algorithms themselves don’t map these behavioral patterns onto anyone’s psychology, we 
humans would do so and hence take the algorithms to track website users’ mental states. 
 
There are more sophisticated kinds of algorithmic tracking. For instance, Facebook 
individualizes each user’s News Feed to highlight content that keeps users engaged. It does so 
by drawing on a wide range of data about users’ Facebook ‘likes’, the profiles they visit most, 
whom they message, and what they specify about themselves on their profile (Lada et al., 
2021). Some of these computations involve psychometric tracking, i.e., processing in which AI 
systems measure and explicitly attribute to website users psychological features including 
personality traits based on their online behavior, or user data (Rust et al., 2021).  
 
To illustrate, in a study by Youyou et al. (2015), Facebook ‘likes’ and personality profiles from 
>86,000 volunteers were collected. The personality profiles were obtained with surveys that 
captured (inter alia) respondents’ political attitudes and the ‘Big Five’ personality traits (i.e., 
extroversion, agreeableness, openness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism). Machine learning 
was then used to train3 an algorithm to find patterns in the data and accurately connect 
																																																								
2 There are other recommender systems that don’t use collaborative filtering; for details, see Smith and Linden 
(2017). 
3 For details on how algorithms are trained in the process of machine learning, see Burrell (2016). 
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individuals’ Facebook ‘likes’ with their personality scores. When it was subsequently presented 
with (e.g., 300) ‘likes’ of website users that it hadn’t encountered before, the algorithm could 
predict many of the users’ psychological features (e.g., political attitudes and the Big Five) 
more accurately than even these individuals’ spouses.  
 
Unsurprisingly, AI systems for psychometric tracking4 are now employed by, for instance, 
social media companies (Bay, 2018) and consultant firms (see the Cambridge Analytica scandal) 
to segment website users into personality groups for tailored advertising and messaging (Hinds 
& Joinson, 2019). Indeed, IBM offers a program (“IBM Watson Personality Insights”) to private 
individuals for predicting website users’ “personality, needs, and values” based on social media 
data for highly targeted messaging.5 How should we conceptualize what all these AI systems are 
doing in their psychometric or simple algorithmic tracking?  
 
3. From preference and trait ascriptions to mindreading 
 
It might be suggested that even if algorithmic tracking involved computer systems that ascribe 
preferences, interests, and personality traits to website users in much the same way as we 
humans do it, this would still not mean that algorithmic tracking also involves mindreading. For 
it isn’t obvious that, even in humans, ascriptions of preferences and personality traits qualify as 
genuine instances of mindreading: Some researchers hold that trait attributions don’t involve 
any mental state attributions, but just behavior reading (Malle et al., 2001; Andrews, 2012). 
 
However, while work on mindreading has traditionally focused primarily and mostly on 
ascriptions of (false) beliefs (Phillips & Norby, 2019), many other mental state ascriptions are 
now recognized as instances of mindreading too. They include attributions of desires, 
perceptions, knowledge, stereotypes, and, importantly, preferences and personality traits 
(Spaulding, 2020).  
 
The inclusion of preference and trait ascriptions is supported (inter alia) by neuroscientific 
evidence that, in humans, representations of traits and mental states have a shared neural basis 
(Thornton & Mitchell, 2018), and by considerations suggesting that they often involve implicit 
mental state attributions. Spaulding (2020) notes that when we ascribe to, say, an elderly 
woman the trait of being nurturing, we aren’t merely drawing an inference about her behavior 
that she will, for example, buy gifts for her grandchildren. After all, one can do so resentfully. 
Rather, we predict that she will buy gifts because we assume she cares about the children, and 
wants them to see that she loves them. In such cases, our trait inferences involve mindreading, 
Spaulding holds, because they imply certain implicit attributions of mental states (emotions, 
desires, etc.).  
 
I will endorse this view here: trait and preference ascriptions with underlying implicit mental 
state ascriptions are proper instances of mindreading. The notion of ‘implicit mental state 
ascription’ here differs from the one used in the psychological literature on “implicit 
mindreading” (Low & Perner, 2012). In that literature, implicit mindreading is an early 
developing, largely non-conceptual, non-verbal, and automatic capacity to understand mental 
states that is measured indirectly via, for instance, eye gaze tracking (ibid). I will here set this 
kind of cognition aside and will use the term ‘implicit mental state ascription that underlies trait 
ascriptions’ simply to mean ‘mental state ascription that underlies or is presupposed by, but 
																																																								
4 For a meta-analysis of research on AI systems’ accuracy in personality judgments, see Azucar et al. (2018). 
5 See https://www.ibm.com/watson/services/personality-insights/. 
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isn’t consciously represented in, trait ascriptions’. The above example of the elderly woman 
illustrates what is meant. 
 
4. Algorithmic tracking involves mindreading  
 
Even if preference or trait ascriptions qualify as mindreading, it might still seem clear that 
simple algorithmic tracking doesn’t involve mindreading. As noted, it doesn’t even involve a 
categorization of people in terms of preferences or interests. Even when it comes to 
psychometric tracking, one might hold that the mapping of online behavior onto, for instance, 
personality scores hardly amounts to a mental state ascription. However, I will now argue that 
algorithmic tracking is often a process in which website operators are embedded and attribute 
mental states to people. It should thus be construed as a process that itself involves 
mindreading.  
 
Notice first that a website operator could be a single individual running a website, or a 
company, for instance, Facebook. Both may use computers for algorithmic tracking. In the case 
of Facebook, different people may monitor website traffic, and, as a team, perform cognitive 
tasks such as supervising, designing, and using algorithms (Hao, 2021). Since it is then the 
relevant Facebook team as a whole (not any individual member of it) that produces the related 
cognitive outputs, the team can be viewed as a “distributed cognitive system” (Giere, 2007). 
This view is compatible with holding that the cognitive outputs of that system are only realized 
in some of the heads of individual members (i.e., the group itself may not cognize). The point 
here is just that independently of whether the website operator is an individual or a company, 
in algorithmic tracking, there is a cognitive system managing algorithms.  
 
In fact, if website operators (single individuals or groups) want to personalize their websites to 
users by tracking their browsing, clicks, ‘likes’, etc., they evidently can’t do so without AI 
technology: The personal online data are either inaccessible, or too vast to keep track of for 
them. Website operators thus rely on analytics algorithms (e.g., Google Analytics) for 
monitoring website traffic. These algorithms often don’t identify website users as particular 
persons but instead anonymize IP addresses.6 Other analytics tools are available, however, 
that enable operators to connect IP addresses to specific persons and track their behavior across 
visits, devices, and platforms, combining anonymous and identified user behavior even for >90 
days apart (such tools include, e.g., Heap Analytics7 or Oribi8) (raising privacy concerns).  
 
Importantly, while they typically function automatically, the algorithms used for website traffic 
monitoring themselves aren’t entirely independent. Website operators monitor these systems 
to check whether they correctly track what website users are interested in, want to buy or view 
(e.g., by measuring conversions, time spent on the website, ratings). Given their financial 
interests, website operators will also often optimize the algorithms in light of their performance 
(e.g., Nathani et al., 2020; Cooper, 2021). This might include retraining these systems on new 
data (Zhang et al., 2020), rewriting them, introducing new cookies9 for more behavioral data, 
or combining different kinds of digital footprint data (Burke, 2007). Since website operators 
often don’t just passively employ AI systems for algorithmic tracking but continuously “tinker” 
																																																								
6 For algorithms or website operators to ascribe mental states to website users and so to mindread them, they 




9 These are simple text files that website store on one’s computer to track one’s preferences. 
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them to increasingly better identify aspects of website users’ psychology (interests, etc., 
Cooper, 2021), website operators can be viewed as part10 of the algorithmic tracking process. 
 
There is then reason to believe that the algorithmic tracking itself also involves psychological 
ascriptions. For suppose you are a website operator who is using AI systems for simple 
algorithmic tracking to increase sales or user engagement. One day you learn that these systems 
recommend to a particular website user U a product or content C on the basis of U’s browsing 
data. Suppose you then assert: 
 
P1. ‘Given U’s browsing behavior, the computer systems recommend C to U, but this 
doesn’t mean that U is likely to be interested in, feel positive about, and want C.’ 
 
This assertion seems odd. If you don’t assume that the AI systems capture U’s interests, 
feelings, and desires, it is hard to see why you employ them to increase sales or improve 
website users’ online experience to begin with. The apparent oddness of P1 is tied to the 
negation it involves. When we remove it, the assertion is fine: 
 
P2. ‘Given U’s browsing behavior, the computer systems recommend C to U, meaning 
that U is likely to be interested in, feel positive about, and want C.’ 
 
To the extent that P2 is a plausible claim, there is ground to believe that algorithmic tracking 
involves at least implicit ascriptions of mental states (interests, feelings, desires, etc.) to website 
users by website operators. And since implicit ascriptions of such mental features plausibly 
count as instance of mindreading (Spaulding, 2020), this means that algorithmic tracking 
(construed as a process in which website operators are embedded) involves mindreading.11  
 
5. Conditions for extended mindreading 
 
In the remainder, I will provide reasons to believe that in algorithmic tracking, human agents 
aren’t merely causally coupled to algorithms to perform mindreading, but the human 
mindreading is literally partly realized by these systems. This view relates to Clark and 
Chalmers’ (1998) HEC. It will thus be useful to first introduce some motivations for HEC in 
general and specify conditions for extended cognition that we can then apply to algorithmic 
tracking. 
 
To support HEC, Clark and Chalmers’ main argument involves a thought experiment with two 
protagonists: Otto, who suffers from Alzheimer’s, and Inga, who is healthy. To support his 
daily functioning, Otto routinely uses a notebook to write down and remember information. 
One day, Inga and Otto hear of an exhibition at an art museum and decide to see it. While Inga 
recalls the museum’s location from her biological memory and then goes there, Otto looks up 
the location in his notebook and then heads in the same direction.  
 
																																																								
10 Other human agents, companies, or networks (e.g., when the personalization algorithms are provided by third-
parties; Amazon Personalize, etc.) might also be involved in this process. I will focus here primarily only on 
website operators.  
11 In these cases, website operators don’t necessarily merely discover a user’s existing, fixed, and durable mental 
states (e.g., preferences). Their algorithms might often shape or even create website users’ preferences (e.g., via 
reinforcement procedures) to maximize revenues (Crockett, 2017; Frischmann & Selinger, 2018). This view is 
compatible with, and becomes more plausible in light of, the point here that algorithmic tracking also involves at 
least some detection of website users’ existing mental states. After all, if they are able to identify users’ current 
preferences, etc., website operators can more effectively influence and better tailor contents to them.  
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Clark and Chalmers argue that since Otto’s notebook is functionally equivalent to Inga’s belief 
about the museum in guiding his action, offering “sameness of opportunity” (not fine-grained 
identity; Clark, 2008, p. 8), there is reason to assume that it partly realizes his belief about the 
museum. This is because “[w]hat makes some information count as a belief is the role it plays, 
and there is no reason why the relevant role can be played only from inside the body”, Clark 
and Chalmers (1998, p. 14) hold. They hence propose a 
 
(1) parity principle: “If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a 
process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as 
part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is […] part of the cognitive 
process” (ibid, p. 8).  
 
Since this condition might result in implausibly wide extensions of the mind into, for instance, 
public libraries or the yellow pages (resulting in “cognitive bloat”, Allen-Hermanson, 2013), 
Clark and Chalmers introduced additional criteria for an artefact to count as part of the mind. 
These conditions include that for an agent (individual or group) S a candidate artefact A needs to 
be 
 
(2) reliably available and typically invoked (for a particular cognitive task), and 
(3) any information retrieved from A must be automatically endorsed and 
(4) easily accessible to S (Clark, 2010, p. 46). 
 
However, Adams and Aizawa (2008) object that while these conditions might ensure a close 
causal coupling between A and S, it still doesn’t follow that A is also constitutive of S’s mind – 
assuming otherwise is committing a “coupling-constitution fallacy”. In response, Clark and 
others have proposed further arguments for HEC (inter alia) by drawing on considerations from 
dynamical systems theory, according to which two systems create one overall extended system 
if they are in continuous bidirectional interactions (Clark, 2008, p. 80, 131).  
 
Palermos (2014) offers the following argument for this view. When two individual systems 
interact in ongoing bidirectional feedback loops to achieve a cognitive task, this results in new 
systemic properties, properties that can’t adequately be attributed to one of the interactants 
alone. Hence, we need to postulate an extended system. Moreover, in the interactions between 
the two subsystems, we can’t “decompose systems in terms of distinct inputs and outputs from 
the one to the other”, because the “effects of each component to the other are not entirely 
endogenous to [i.e., solely originating from within] the affecting component, and vice versa” 
(ibid, p. 33). Since that is so, the two subsystems can’t plausibly be viewed as merely causally 
coupled but are rather constitutively linked in the broader, extended system of which they are 
part. 
 
To illustrate, consider (Palermo’s example of) telescopic observations in which an astronomer 
needs to reposition the telescope while adjusting its lens, causing particular effects on the lens 
such that shapes appear. These shapes aren’t fully specific representations of, say, planets or 
comets yet. Rather, what is depicted on the lens depends on the astronomer’s further telescope 
adjustments, until planets, comets, or stars become visible. The final outcome can’t be 
attributed to either the astronomer or the telescope alone, as neither can produce it alone. We 
thus need to assume that it is a property of a broader system comprising both.  
 
Additionally, the way each of the two parts is influenced by the other isn’t wholly exogenous 
to, i.e., solely originating from outside the other: The effects of the telescope (e.g., shapes on 
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its lens) on the astronomer partly originate from the astronomer’s own effects on the telescope 
(e.g., her lens adjustments). The telescope’s effects thus can’t adequately be conceptualized as 
mere inputs to (i.e., as originating wholly from outside) the astronomer. And the astronomer’s 
effects on the telescope, in turn, can’t be adequately viewed as mere output to the telescope 
because they partly originate from ‘within’ the telescope (from how blurry its images are). 
Since we can’t clearly separate inputs from outputs between the interactants, there is reason to 
postulate a system in which the astronomer’s cognitive processing (e.g., object recognition) is 
partly realized by the telescope.  
 
Taken together, these points support a (here) final condition for extended cognition: 
 
(5) A counts as part of S’s cognitive system if there is a continuous bidirectional 
interaction (feedback loops) between A and S (Clark, 2008, pp. 80, 131l; Palermos, 
2014).  
 
Condition (5) helps address the ‘cognitive bloat’ objection to HEC: Individuals aren’t in 
continuous feedback loops with public libraries, the yellow pages, etc. And given (5), the 
postulation of extended systems no longer needs to involve a ‘coupling-constitution fallacy’: 
The emergence of systemic properties from S-A couplings that involve effects that can’t be 
neatly decomposed into inputs and outputs provides a basis for the constitution claim.  
 
Indeed, many philosophers now explicitly endorse (5) as a sufficient condition for extended 
cognition. They hold that “when an agent is functionally integrated through ongoing feedback 
loops with her social environment, the environment doesn’t just causally influence her but 
becomes part of her character, for good or ill” (Alfano & Skorburg, 2017: 468; for other 
philosophers committed to this view, see Carter & Palermos, 2016; Carter et al., 2017; 
Palermos, 2014, 2016; Palermos & Tollefsen, 2018). While not all advocates of HEC thus hold 
that all of conditions (1)-(5) are necessary for cognitive extensions, I will here use all five as 
guides for settling whether a particular process qualifies as extended cognition.  
 
6. Extended mindreading 
 
We now have five conditions to explore whether, in algorithmic tracking, website operators or 
users employ AI systems merely as tools for mindreading, or whether their mindreading is 
literally extended into them. I will first consider interactions between website operators and 
algorithms before turning to website users.  
 
6.1 Extended mindreading of website operators 
 
To see whether website operators’ interactions with computers during algorithmic tracking 
ever meet condition (1), i.e., the parity principle, it is useful to first reflect on, for instance, a 
book recommendation service that doesn’t involve the Internet. Suppose you own a bookstore. 
Even if you don’t have a computer, you could still make notes of your customers’ previous 
purchases, ratings, store browsing, demographics, and so on. Additionally, you could segment 
your costumers into groups with similar profiles so that when you meet a new costumer and 
learn that she fits into one of the groups, you can infer and predict that, given the behavior and 
preferences of other members of that group, she too is likely to find certain books interesting, 
and may want to read them. In your thinking, you move from an interpretation of the 
individual’s behavior to ascriptions of and inferences about her interests, feelings, and desires, 
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i.e., her mental states. What you are doing can thus plausibly be viewed as an instance of 
mindreading. 
 
Now, many operators of online bookstores (e.g., Amazon, or individuals running commercial 
websites) perform the same kind of process just envisaged, but with AI systems. These systems 
work largely automatically. But since they are used to increase sales and improve people’s 
online experience, website operators, including the programmers they employ, will still 
regularly check whether these systems do what they are designed to do (i.e., identify what 
people are interested in, want to buy, etc.) and update them if need be. Furthermore, even if 
the systems produce recommendations for website users while the operators are engaged 
elsewhere, if the website operators were afterwards asked to motivate the recommendations to 
a user they would arguably still mention the user’s mental states (preferences, interests, etc.). 
After all, the identification of people’s preferences, interests, and goals is the reason why 
algorithmic tracking is employed on websites in the first place. There is thus ground to hold 
that the process includes at least implicit ascriptions of mental states. Given this and the fact 
that we would view the inferences involved in your case above as instances of mindreading if 
they happened in the head, there is reason to believe that when those inferences occur in the 
interactions between website operators and computer systems, they meet condition (1) for 
extended mindreading.  
 
Such interactions between human agents and artifacts also often meet conditions (2)-(4). For 
instance, Amazon offers its algorithmic tracking systems to any company or individual 
interested in using them on their websites (see “Amazon Personalize”) for “real-time 
personalized recommendations – no ML [Machine learning] expertise required”.12 Thus, in line 
with (2), these systems are readily available with a computer with Internet access (e.g., a 
smartphone). Additionally, in line with conditions (3) and (4), many website operators 
(individuals, Amazon, or Facebook) do typically employ AI systems for algorithmic tracking 
and automatically endorse their outputs, which are easily accessible to them online. In many 
cases, the interactions between individuals, groups, or companies and computers that are 
involved in algorithmic tracking will thus satisfy conditions (2)-(4).  
 
Turning finally to condition (5), are there continuous feedback loops between A and S in the 
cases at hand? As noted, some website operators continuously update their algorithms in light 
of their performance so as to achieve increasingly faster and “more accurate” recommendations 
and “prediction models” to ensure market success (Zanker et al., 2019: 160; Nathani et al., 
2020). To the extent that website operators monitor and optimize the algorithms they use, 
algorithmic tracking will involve a continuous feedback loop between humans or groups 
(including Internet companies) and algorithms: Website operators (1) measure the algorithms’ 
outputs, (2) check them against user data (e.g., from users’ browsing or social media) for 
validity, (3) update them (if they under-perform) to better track and respond to users’ 
interests, (4) check the outputs of the altered algorithms, readjust, and so on. In this feedback 
loop, the cognitive feat of identifying (influencing and satisfying) website users’ preferences, 
interests, and goals is gradually improved.  
 
Importantly, the result can’t be adequately attributed to the website operator or the computer 
systems alone. Neither one can do the algorithmic tracking successfully wholly on their own: 
Without the optimizing interventions of the website operator on these systems, the latter’s 




users’ profiles change. Similarly, without these systems, website operators, in turn, can’t 
effectively track users’ digital footprints. The here relevant type of algorithmic tracking thus 
emerges as a systemic property, as its origin can’t be explained without postulating a broader 
system comprising both website operator and computer technology.  
 
It might be suggested that in this broader system, website operators and computers are still 
only causally coupled. However, for this to be the case, we would need to be able to clearly 
separate inputs and outputs relative to both interactants, and there is reason to hold that this 
can’t always be easily done. For notice that while the AI involved might program itself (Burrell, 
2016), the effects of the resulting algorithms (e.g., the detection of website users’ preferences) 
on the website operator still partly originate from the operator’s own effects on these systems, 
namely the operator’s adjustments of the parameters within which the algorithms operate (and 
train themselves). These systems’ effects thus can’t adequately be conceptualized as originating 
entirely from outside the website operator. Furthermore, since the effects of the operator on 
the AI systems, in turn, are directly influenced by the performance of those systems, these 
effects too can’t adequately be viewed as originating solely from (being mere outputs of) the 
website operator. Given the dynamic interdependence of the interactants, inputs and outputs 
relative to each interactant can’t be clearly demarcated. This undercuts the idea that the 
interactants are just causally coupled and suggests that in algorithmic tracking, they instead 
form one single system meeting condition (5) for extended mindreading.  
 
But what if the website operator is not an individual but a company, for instance, Facebook? 
Several researchers have argued that “groups of people can manifest cognitive capacities that go 
beyond the simple aggregation of the cognitive capacities of their individual members” such that 
the groups themselves count as cognizers (Theiner et al., 2010, p. 378). In fact, the arguments 
that support condition (5) have been used to maintain that if the members of a social group 
collaboratively perform a cognitive task by interacting continuously and reciprocally with each 
other, then they realize a socially distributed group cognition; i.e., the group then itself (vs. 
merely socially embedded individuals) cognizes (Gallagher, 2013; Palermos, 2016; Palermos & 
Tollefsen, 2018; Carter et al., 2018). For, as before, systemic properties will arise that can 
only be adequately ascribed to the whole group, and in the interactions between the group’s 
members, inputs and outputs between them can’t be clearly separated.  
 
Now, Facebook has teams of programmers, managers, and AI researchers that do form dynamic 
feedback loops with each other and together monitor and control the systems involved in 
algorithmic tracking and website personalization (Oremus, 2016; Hardest, 2017; Hao, 2021). 
Indeed, it is hard to see how any big Internet company that both uses and itself continuously 
tweaks its own algorithms to refine personalization outputs and maximize profit could manage 
such a complex task without the relevant individual employees of the company continuously 
mutually influencing each other in that task. It is thus plausible that if we assume condition (5), 
then Facebook (or a specific team within it), too, might in the here relevant cases realize group 
cognition. The preceding points concerning conditions (1)-(5) then equally hold for Internet 
companies such as Facebook and not only for individual persons as the website operators.  
 
6.2 Extended mindreading of website users 
 
There is another kind of algorithmic tracking in which interactions between humans and 
computers meet conditions (1)-(5). It involves website users’ mindreading, and relates to cases 
in which people browse the Internet for shopping or entertainment purposes without yet 
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knowing what exactly they want. It will be useful to first consider again an example in which no 
computer is involved.  
 
Suppose you are out for dinner, look at a restaurant menu, and wonder ‘What do I want to 
eat?’ You reflect on your previous choices at similar places, visualize some of the dishes on the 
menu, and, upon gauging your emotional responses to what you are thinking about, conclude 
that you would probably like to eat dish D. In your deliberation, you worked out what you 
want by running through possible dishes in your head in mental imagery and tracking your 
responses to what you are imagining. While this continuous feedback process might sometimes 
just be used for making a choice, we often also draw on it to learn about what we want. In fact, 
a wealth of psychological studies found that people frequently unknowingly confabulate mental 
states (decisions, desires, etc.) post hoc by interpreting their own behavior (including mental 
imagery; Carruthers, 2011; Cushman, 2019). These data suggest that we often lack 
introspective access to our own propositional attitudes, including desires, and depend on 
indirect, interpretive methods to learn about them (Carruthers, 2011). Think, for instance, of 
the way in which one might learn that one fancies a person by observing one’s nervousness 
when being around them. It seems plausible enough that the just outlined kind of imagistic 
feedback process, too, is at least sometimes a way in which we come to know our own mental 
states. If that is so, then that process counts in these cases as mindreading directed at oneself: 
One identifies one’s own mental states (desires) via gauging and interpreting one’s responses to 
imagery.  
 
Returning to algorithm tracking, when using Amazon, Netflix, and other websites people are 
often in a similar situation as you are in the scenario just envisaged. They visit these websites 
unsure of what exactly they want to buy or watch, and then outsource to AI systems the 
process of identifying what they want by providing websites either directly (e.g., via product 
ratings) or indirectly (e.g., via their browsing, past purchases, previously watched movies) with 
digital footprint data. The websites’ AI systems then use these data, form a user profile, identify 
the corresponding group of similar subjects, and match preference profiles of group members 
with that of the individual before presenting non-overlapping choices as recommendations to 
the user. The user, in turn, responds with clicks, producing data that the AI systems recycle to 
update their offers, gradually honing in on what the user is interested in or wants to buy.  
 
In these ongoing interactions, neither the AI nor the website user know upfront what the user 
wants. Both learn about (and shape) it in their interactions. And while these interactions may 
commonly serve users to make a choice, they also at the same time often provide users with 
insights into their own mental states. For instance, when a website user finally settles for a 
particular recommended item, she will generally take that item to be something that she indeed 
wants rather than something that she is merely disposed to click on. For she relied on 
algorithmic tracking to answer the question ‘What do I want to watch (buy, etc.)?’ and it 
would be strange if, when clicking on, say, ‘confirm’ to finalize a choice, she thought that the 
item is not something that she wants. This suggests that algorithmic tracking in such 
interactions between website users and AI often involves at least an implicit ascription of a 
mental state (desire) on the part of the website users to themselves. These cases can thus be 
viewed as situations in which website users employ algorithms for reading their own mind.  
 
Notice that in these cases the ongoing feedback loop and mutual causation between user and 
algorithm functionally mirrors a process that we would in the dinner choice example above 
readily treat as an instance of mindreading if it occurred in the head. This means that we now 
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have grounds to hold that these interactions between websites users and algorithms meet 
criterion (1) for extended mindreading (and, by extensions, extended decision making).13 
 
It also satisfies conditions (2)-(4). The reason is that the AI systems involved in the feedback 
loop are reliably available online and typically used by many people for online shopping or 
entertainment purposes (e.g., think of people’s daily use of their personalized Netflix site). 
Website users also generally trust them, and they are designed and maintained for the purpose 
of working out (influencing and responding to) what a user wants. Additionally, they are easily 
accessible online with a laptop, or smartphone. Conditions (2)-(4) are thus met.  
 
Finally, turning to condition (5), in the kind of interaction mentioned, as noted, neither the 
computer systems nor the website user know at the beginning what the user wants, but learn 
about it in their interaction. The algorithmic tracking is thus a systemic property of that 
interaction that can’t be ascribed to only one of the two interacts alone. Neither one can 
produce it alone. Moreover, neither the effects of the algorithms on the website user nor the 
effects of the latter on the former are wholly external or internal to each other: What a user 
sees as a recommended item depends on (is partly determined by) the user’s (indirect) impact 
on the algorithms (via her online behavior). It is thus partly an effect of the user herself, not 
merely input she receives from the computer systems.  
 
Similarly, the website user’s response to these systems in turn depends on (is partly 
predetermined by) the algorithms ‘inner’ working (and the website operators’ goals). For 
depending on how accurately they track the user’s preferences and map them onto matching 
recommendations, the user will respond in one way rather than another. The effects of the user 
on the algorithms thus aren’t originating entirely from outside the algorithms either. Since the 
inputs and outputs in these interactions can’t be neatly separated but such a separation is needed 
in order to hold that website users and computer systems are merely causally coupled to each 
other, there is a basis for holding that there is an extended system comprising both that realizes 




While I have now provided several reasons to believe that both website operators’ and users’ 
mindreading is in some cases extended into algorithms, one might still think that the difference 
between this extended mindreading view and the alternative view that human (or group) 
mindreading is just causally coupled to algorithms is merely a terminological one with little 
practical value. I will now argue otherwise. The case for extended mindreading has significant 
benefits for the ethics of AI that speak in favor of endorsing the notion of extended (vs. causally 
embedded) mindreading.  
 
7.1 Focusing on website users 
 
If website users’ mindreading extends into computer algorithms, then these algorithms also 
acquire a moral status. To illustrate, consider people with Alzheimer who may structure their 
immediate living environment (e.g., their flats) so that it compensates their increasing cognitive 
impairment by offering reminders of information (e.g., by labelling objects). If we change such 
people’s personalized, self-structured settings, we would reduce their memory abilities, raising 
																																																								
13 Settling what one wants is commonly also an instance of practical reasoning to make a decision. Since this 
reasoning is part of the kind of mindreading at issue here, the argument for extended mindreading here may 
equally support the notion of extended decision making.  
	 13	
clear moral problems (Drayson & Clark, 2020). Similarly, Heersmink (2017) argues that the 
more people depend on artifacts for their cognitive functioning, the deeper these objects are 
integrated with their cognitive system and so the higher the objects’ moral status. Since the 
effects that the artifacts “have are typically stronger when the dependency is greater and the 
integration denser,” it “matters whether cognition is merely embedded or genuinely distributed 
for the moral status of cognitive artifacts” (ibid, p. 28). Relatedly, if website users’ mindreading 
is sometimes extended and not merely embedded into algorithms online, then these algorithms 
have a higher moral status.  
 
This point can be taken further. As Carter and Palermos (2016, p. 549) highlight, according to 
“current legal and ethical theorizing”, “intentional harm to a part of a person responsible for the 
person’s mental and other faculties constitutes personal assault” when it happens without the 
person’s consent (and no overriding considerations exist; e.g., the protection of others). Based 
on this point, Carter and Palermos argue that since our mental faculties can be partly 
constituted by external artifacts, having our integrated epistemic artifacts intentionally 
compromised plausibly counts as a case of personal assault, i.e., an action that people are 
generally legally protected against.  
 
Now, in the cases when website users’ mindreading extends into personalization algorithms, 
the latter are part of the users’ minds. Hence, if we extrapolate from Carter and Palermos’ 
rationale, then altering these systems without the users’ consent could count as personal assault 
too. This matters because commercial websites often adjust their algorithms to maximize 
conversions, which might result in outputs (e.g., recommendations) that aren’t in the best 
(e.g., financial) interest of website users. These algorithms thus aren’t neutral in that the 
humans whose minds extend into them remain fully autonomous decision-makers – by 
adjusting these systems, website operators can alter people’s preferences to maximize their 
own profit (Frischmann & Selinger, 2018). Adopting the extended mindreading view helps 
here because such alterations could then in some cases be construed as intentional harm to parts 
of website users’ mind without their consent. This notion, which is unavailable on the 
embedded mindreading view, has the benefit of enabling website users to refer to the 
mentioned ethical and legal frameworks to protect themselves against such interventions. 
 
Notice that in treating the extended cognitive system that comprises (inter alia) the 
personalization algorithms as partly the website user’s, the extended mindreading view does not 
ignore that others currently own and manage the algorithmic components of that system. The 
point is instead that it is more plausible that ownership and control over the algorithms should 
shift more to the website users if they interact with the algorithms so intimately that they can be 
viewed as part of their minds than if the interactions and loops result merely in a causal 
coupling. Indeed, while there are different notions of private ownership, according to Locke’s 
(1967; pp. 285) labor theory of property, close engagement with an object (e.g., farming the 
land) can create property rights: One’s work enters into the object, turning the latter into one’s 
property (Gallagher, 2013). Given this, in highlighting the high degree of interdependence and 
mutual investment between website users and algorithms, the notion of extended mindreading 
might help redistribute the power over these systems.  
 
The extended mindreading view can also boost people’s attention to the risks of online control 
and manipulation connected to algorithmic tracking. For it seems plausible that the more one 
thinks of something as literally part of oneself, the more one cares about what others do to it. In 
suggesting that algorithms such as those assisting people’s online shopping are literally parts of 
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website users’ minds, the extended mindreading view helps raise people’s awareness of 
potentially harmful consequences of their online behavior. 
 
This view can also contribute to the protection of people’s online privacy. For Lynch (2013), 
privacy of thought involves that individuals can access their own thoughts in a way another 
person can’t (i.e., ‘from the inside’), and that “you can, at least sometimes, control what I 
know about your thoughts”: you “can refrain from telling me the extent of your views and your 
feelings” (p. 3). If people’s mindreading literally extends into computer algorithms, then 
website operators’ access to these algorithms may represent intrusions upon website users’ 
privacy of thought: in having one’s mind open to view to website operators, the possibility for 
free deliberation is reduced, because one is less at liberty to privately mull things over (Fritz & 
Reiner, 2016). To the extent that people “tag Internet-connected algorithmic devices as their 
extended minds, this raises the bar for privacy, qualifying the information within the amalgam 
of our brains and our devices as private thoughts” (Reiner & Nagle, 2017). And if 
personalization algorithms are constitutive parts of website users’ mindreading, this provides 
privacy campaigners with argumentative support to call for more protection of website users 
from algorithms. The extended mindreading view thus offers conceptual ways to reclaim our 
autonomy in the face of new forms of computational control and privacy intrusions.  
 
7.2 Algorithms as cognitive extensions of website operators 
 
The notion of extended mindreading also has significant ethical benefits (that the embedded 
mindreading view lacks) when it comes to website operators’ mindreading via AI algorithms. To 
see this, notice first that one important feature that distinguishes AI algorithms is their ability to 
learn (Burrell, 2016): They don’t just implement human-designed rules, but create their own, 
for instance, by revising the rules originally designed by human programmers, or starting from 
scratch. Given this, if an algorithm designed by computers makes a mistake, whose fault is it?  
 
The problem is that algorithms don’t fit well into current views of liability: “Liability requires 
injurious acts, but what does it mean for an algorithm to act? Only people act; and algorithms 
are not people” (Diamantis, 2021, p. 801). Currently, when one of their algorithms causes 
harm to a website user, website operators might try to argue that despite their belief otherwise, 
the algorithm evolved in ways that introduced defects and so this isn’t the operators’ 
responsibility (Villasenor, 2019). 
 
To avoid this problem, Diamantis (2021) notes that corporate liability law already recognizes 
that corporations are “people” capable of acting injuriously through their employees, because 
they control and benefit from their employees’ work. Given this, he argues, we should also be 
able to attribute algorithmic harms to any corporation that (a) exercises enough control over 
the algorithm(s) in question, and (b) lays substantial claim to the productive benefits of the 
algorithm(s). This is because in these cases corporations then act through the algorithms, which 
become extensions of the corporations as ‘persons’.  
 
Diamantis (2020, p. 917) goes further, arguing for an “extension of the corporate mind from 
human employees to automated algorithms”. He suggests that such extension happens when (1) 
a “corporation knows information embedded in its algorithms”; (2) the “information is available 
and the employee/algorithm (on behalf of the corporation) typically invokes” it; (3) the 
“employee/algorithm (on behalf of the corporation) more or less automatically endorses the 
information upon retrieval”; (4) the “employee/algorithm (on behalf of the corporation) can 
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easily access the information”; and (5) the algorithm uses the “information in a way that accrues 
some […] benefit to the corporation” (Diamantis, 2020, p. 921-922).  
 
I’m sympathetic to these lines of thought. The view that in algorithmic tracking website 
operators’ mindreading might literally extends into personalization algorithms helps develop 
and offers additional support for Diamantis’ points: Diamantis doesn’t yet consider 
mindreading,14 and his conditions (1)-(5) are more susceptible to common objections to HEC 
such as the “coupling-constitution fallacy” or the “cognitive bloat” critique (Adams & Aizawa, 
2008; Allen-Hermanson, 2013) than the conditions I relied on above. Specifically, condition 
(5) that I relied on is supported by arguments from dynamical systems theory, which advocates 
of HEC developed precisely to address these common critiques of HEC (Palermos, 2014).  
 
Moreover, if, for instance, Facebook’s use of algorithms to work out website users’ mental 
states can be viewed as the company’s acting through these algorithms not only because of the 
reasons Diamantis mentions but also because of the reasons I outlined above, then corporate 
liability law can be used even more effectively against the company in cases of algorithmic 
harm. Holding corporations liable for the things they do through their algorithms may also 
prompt them to ensure their algorithms operate in socially beneficial ways. A conceptualization 
of mindreading that helps recognize that website operators sometimes act through their 
algorithms may thus also encourage corporations to exercise responsible control over these 
systems.  
 
In short, no matter whether the extended mindreading that we focus on is performed by 
website operators (individuals/corporations) or users, the extended mindreading view provides 
new conceptual tools to correct the current imbalance in power and control between website 
operators and users with respect to the algorithms at play. It provides conceptual links to be 
able to use already existing ethical and legal framework concerning (a) personal assault 
(Palermos & Carter, 2016), and (b) corporate liability law (Diamantis, 2020, 2021) to guard 
people from potential algorithmic harm by website operators including big Internet companies 




Mindreading happens inside people’s head. But does it only occur there? Here I challenged the 
assumption that it does by relating mindreading to HEC and the phenomenon of algorithmic 
tracking. I argued that if we endorse common conditions for extended cognition, then in 
algorithmic tracking, the mindreading of both website operators and users is sometimes not 
only causally coupled to but partly realized by and so extended into the computer systems 
involved. This is (inter alia) because arithmetic tracking is a property that isn’t adequately 
ascribed to either these computer systems or the website operators or users alone but emerges 
from a system that includes both. And within this broader system, we can’t clearly distinguish 
inputs and outputs going from one to the other interactant.  
 
While the argument I offered here for the extended mindreading view is conditional in nature, 
it has several interesting implications. Since it rests on the assumption of conditions for 
extended cognition that are widely accepted among friends of HEC, many advocates of HEC 
are now committed to the notion of extended mindreading. More importantly, while there 
																																																								
14 Diamantis also doesn’t yet note that website users’ mindreading, too, might extend into algorithms. Nor does he 
consider the point above related to existing assault legislation. This point can, however, usefully be combined with 
his argument.  
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might be many objections to HEC and the notion of extended mindreading, the preceding 
discussion suggests that this notion also offers novel ways in which we may effectively alert 
people to and protect ourselves against the increasing risks of computational control and online 
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